Nussbaum’s Response to Susan Okin 🔗

In Martha Nussbaum’s paper “On Hearing Women’s Voices: A Reply to Susan Okin,” Nussbaum ardently defends her capabilities approach towards the attainment of justice for impoverished women against Okin’s critique. This paper intends to scrutinize the thread of Nussbaum’s justification of the capabilities approach and evaluate whether it responds effectively to Okin’s prime concerns on poor women’s voices.

Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, rooted in the notion of human dignity, promotes a list of ten basic entitlements intrinsic to living a life that fulfills human dignity (Nussbaum, pp. 101-104). Okin contends this list does not reflect the urgent needs of poor women, instead representing a “sophisticated” set of aspirations more aligned with the life of an educated, Western woman (Okin, pp. 296). The focus here is Nussbaum’s rebuttal to the criticism that her capabilities approach is overly idealized, failing to align with the immediate desires and needs of poor women (Nussbaum, pp. 101-104).

Through her methodology, Nussbaum asserts the importance of considering the preferences of the poor, while also navigating the risk of preferences being shaped by unequal social conditions – a phenomenon known as ‘adaptive preferences’ (Nussbaum, pp. 148-158). By engaging with empirical material and anecdotal narratives, she aims to leverage her Socratic methodological framework, positing that it can adapt to cultural differences and provide a comprehensive view rooted in respecting human dignity (Nussbaum, pp. 1-18).

However, Nussbaum’s reliance on her Socratic, intuitive dialogue raises concerns regarding its ability to account for the urgent needs voiced by impoverished women, which could potentially be omitted in her approach. While she acknowledges the malleability of her list, one might question the feasibility of this approach when confronted with cultures that have entrenched norms contradicting her proposed capabilities, such as gender equality.

Moreover, Nussbaum’s effort to align informed-desire conceptions with her own moral conception highlights a tension in her methodology. Specifically, her approach appears to place a significant weight on moral reasoning, potentially overlooking or diminishing the expressed preferences of those living in poverty (Nussbaum, pp. 152-153). This approach might conflict with Okin’s stress upon heeding the direct and expressed demands of impoverished women, particularly those rooted in immediate physical and nutritional needs. If the capabilities list is, for instance, guided by ideals beyond the keenest felt needs of those women, then there may be an implication that their priorities require reformation in alignment with a predefined conception of human dignity.

Ultimately, Nussbaum’s response attempts to bridge the gap between the immediate needs of impoverished women and the broader framework of capabilities. Yet, whether her method adequately captures and prioritizes the voices of poor women—without superimposing an externally derived notion of ‘dignity’—remains contestable. It appears that behind the theoretical robustness of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, a tension lingers between universalist aspirations and the grounded, lived experiences of the women whom the theory aims to serve. Notwithstanding Nussbaum’s articulated defense, the essential question persists—does her capabilities approach truly resonate with, or rather reformulate, the voices of impoverished women?

Lessons and Relational Relevance 🔗

Evaluating Nussbaum’s capabilities approach in light of Okin’s concerns offers a critical lesson in the balance between normative philosophical theorizing and on-the-ground realities. This critique suggests that while normative frameworks can provide comprehensive visions for justice, they must continually adapt, and be subjected to, the practical insights gained from those living the experiences such theories aim to comprehend and ameliorate. The broader implications for the discourse on women’s rights and justice underscore the necessity of maintaining an active dialogue that is not only philosophically informed but is, above all, deeply attentive to and respectful of women’s articulated needs and desires within their specific cultural contexts.

In conclusion, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach presents a sophisticated and well-intentioned framework for understanding and furthering women’s rights and well-being. However, it arguably overlooks the central importance of engaging with and deferring to the expressed needs of those it seeks to empower—thus reminding philosophers and policymakers alike to ensure that the voices of the marginalized are not silenced by the very theories meant to amplify them.